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ABSTRACT 
 
Safety is of prime importance for aircraft and must 
be considered from the beginning of the design pro-
cess. Conducting a safety analysis involves consid-
erable effort, particularly if traditional methods, such 
as manual fault tree analysis, are used. This may ex-
plain why the analyses are performed usually only 
once or twice during an entire aircraft development. 
Furthermore, traditional methods are hardly linked 
to other tools for system conceptual design. 
In the field of modelling and simulation, multi-
domain object-oriented languages are increasingly 
adopted. They enable an intuitive way of modelling, 
since objects and their interconnections correspond 
with real components. Thus, large-scale system 
models can be created and simulated efficiently. 
This has led to the appearance of model libraries for 
various physical domains, such as mechanics, elec-
trics and hydraulics. Recently, application specific 
libraries emerge, such as flight dynamics and con-
trol, actuation or energy systems. 
 
 
 
Figure1. Stabiliser trim system model and corresponding graph 
 
A new method is developed that integrates safety 
analysis with multi-domain object-oriented model-
ling. This is the contribution aimed by the corre-
sponding paper. First, it recaps the basics of the 
modelling approach. Then, a model of a safety rele-
vant aircraft system, a stabiliser trim control and ac-
tuation system, is established using component mod-
els from generic libraries that are supplemented with 
failure behaviour. Next, a method is developed that 
automatically detects the minimal path sets of a 
technical system based on the corresponding object-
oriented model, thus performing a safety analysis. 
Techniques from graph theory are adopted for com-
putational efficiency and feasibility of the method. 
 The minimal path sets detection method is ex-
emplified by means of the established realistic sys-
tem model. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper describes a method for automated safety 
analysis of a technical system that is represented as a  
multi-domain object-oriented model. The proposed 
method automatically detects the minimal path sets 
of the modelled system. Then, the probability of sys-
tem operation or failure is computed from the mini-
mal path sets using component failure rates. 
Object-oriented modelling based on differential 
algebraic equations offers large expressive power for 
establishing multi-disciplinary engineering tools. In 
addition, the structure of an object-oriented model 
(OOM) resembles the functional paths that cause a 
technical system to operate. This property is exploit-
ed by the minimal path sets detection method. 
Fault modelling is introduced in addition to the 
common modelling of normal operation. This forms 
a basis for the proposed method that belongs to the 
class of state space simulations. In this context, the 
state space denotes the set of all possible combina-
tions of intact and failed components of a system. 
Search algorithms from graph theory are adopted to 
narrow down the state space, thus preventing unfea-
sibility of the method due to an exponential increase 
of the number of combinations and thus simulations 
to be performed. 
The developed modelling approach is not exclu-
sively dedicated to safety analysis. It rather serves 
several purposes, such as system performance or pa-
rameter studies, as usually is the motivation for 
physical modelling and simulation. 
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 re-
caps the basics of OOM, describes the selected mod-
elling approach and establishes an example model of 
a safety relevant aircraft system. Section 3 describes 
the minimal path sets detection and exemplifies the 
method by means of the established system model. 
Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2 MULTI-DOMAIN OBJECT-ORIENTED 
MODELLING OF SAFETY RELEVANT 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 
2.1 Multi-domain object-oriented modelling 
This section briefly recaps the basic principles of the 
modelling approach. 
The idea of multi-domain object-oriented model-
ling was formulated by Elmqvist (1978), who pro-
posed a language called Dymola (Dynamic Model-
ling Language). In object-oriented modelling, 
objects, their boundaries and interconnections corre-
spond with real existing equipment. Physical equa-
tions have to be established or understood only for 
each object. By connecting objects with each other, 
further model equations are introduced. A translator 
then automatically transforms the model equations 
into a simulation ready runtime model. This ap-
proach has a couple of advantages over block dia-
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grams (e.g. Simulink), as explained by the two cor-
responding model implementations of a small elec-
tronic circuit shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Small electronic circuit (a) and its block diagram rep-
resentation (b). Taken from The Modelica Association (2000). 
 
As Figure 1 shows, the OOM (a) retains the phys-
ical structure of the circuit, whereas the block dia-
gram (b) does not. The OOM is changed intuitively 
by removing or adding components and connecting 
them with other components. Different physical do-
mains can be combined in a single model. 
The circuit model includes, among others, a resis-
tor, capacitor and inductor. Such component models 
are available from standard libraries. The model 
equations are v = R⋅i, i = C⋅der(v) and v = L⋅der(i), 
respectively, where der() denotes the time deriva-
tive. Each component has two electric pin interfaces 
(filled and non-filled blue squares in Figure 1 a) that 
include the voltage v as a potential and current i as a 
flow variable. Model equations are introduced for 
connected component (object) interfaces as follows: 
The potential is the same, whereas the sum of flow 
equals zero according to Kirchhoff’s node rule. For 
example, in case of the circuit model shown by Fig-
ure 1 a): v1 = v3 = v7 and i1 + i3 + i7 = 0. 
The system model described in section 2.3 also 
covers the mechanical (M) and hydraulic (H) do-
mains, as well as real and Boolean signals (S). Table 
1 summarises the according interface definitions and 
icons. These appear in Figures 1 (a), 3, 4 and 5. 
Thus, an OOM consists of the equations of each 
object and of those imposed by the connections be-
tween them. By symbolic processing, this set of 
equations is translated into a simulation runtime 
model of the differential algebraic (DAE) form 
?̇?(𝑡) = 𝑨 ∙ 𝒙(𝑡) + 𝑩 ∙ 𝒖(𝑡) 
𝒚(𝑡) = 𝑪 ∙ 𝒙(𝑡) + 𝑫 ∙ 𝒖(𝑡) (1) 
 
Table 1. Model interfaces, icons and domain (dom) identifiers 
connector potential flow icon dom 
electric pin voltage v current i  E 
translational flange position s force f  M 
rotational flange angle ϕ torque τ  M 
hydraulic port pressure p flow rate q  H 
real signal input u, 
output y 
  S 
Boolean signal dto.   S 
2.2 Modelling additions for safety analysis 
2.2.1 Modelling and simulation of failures 
The proposed safety analysis method is based on 
simulation of failures. Component models that only 
reflect normal operation have to be enhanced ac-
cordingly. At system level, control or reconfigura-
tion logics have to be implemented that define how a 
system reacts to the occurrence of failures. The pur-
sued modelling approach is structure invariant, i.e. 
the DAE structure (equation 1) remains always the 
same. Failures are represented by model parameter 
(values in matrices A, B) changes. 
Elmqvist et al. (2014) propose and Bouissou et al. 
(2014) use a structure variant approach that is even 
more flexible for the modelling of failures. Future 
work will combine this approach with the minimal 
path sets detection method described in this paper. 
In general, the concept of minimal path sets dis-
tinguishes only between operation and failure. Thus, 
the proposed detection method addresses two states 
(intact, failed) at component and at system level. 
2.2.2 Indication of system status 
Safety assessment requires the analyst to define cri-
teria that distinguish normal operation from failure 
of a system. The analysis method proposed by this 
paper requires implementing these criteria in a sys-
tem model, such that an output signal indicating the 
system status is computed. A system model is simu-
lated by the analysis method for various combina-
tions of intact and failed components, and the result-
ing system status (operation or failure) is correlated 
with the respective component states. 
2.2.3 Insertion of component failure rates 
Failure rates λ are stored in each component model 
that is enhanced with failures. Constant failure rates 
(exponentially distributed lifetimes) are assumed per 
default. Since the stress level of a component is 
known in the simulation, its failure rate can be 
adapted accordingly. Failure rates are used to com-
pute probability of system operation 𝑅𝑠𝑦𝑠(𝑡) or fail-
ure 𝐹𝑠𝑦𝑠(𝑡) from the detected minimal path sets. 
2.3 Stabiliser trim system model 
This section describes the multi-domain object-
oriented model of a stabiliser trim control and actua-
tion system. This model of a safety relevant aircraft 
system is based on generally available information 
(Airbus Training, Boeing B737 NG, Persson et al. 
2001). It is established for exemplification of the au-
tomated minimal path sets detection method. 
2.3.1 System description 
Longitudinal control of an aircraft is achieved by el-
evators and a horizontal stabiliser surface. The latter 
is positioned by a stabiliser trim control and actua-
tion system. A main part of this system is a 
ballscrew actuator that is equipped with two hydrau-
lic motors to rotate the ballscrew through a reduction 
gear. If the stabiliser is not moved, it is held in place 
by the actuator. To this end, an electro-mechanical, 
power-off engaged brake (POB) is mounted to each 
motor shaft. The brakes are engaged if the associated 
motor is shut off or if the system has to be stopped 
after a failure is detected. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Stabiliser trim control and actuation system 
 
The pilots operate the system via pairs of trim 
switches that are mounted to each control wheel (or 
centre pedestal). The trim switches are spring-loaded 
to the neutral position. To command trimming, the 
two switches of a pair have to be pushed up or down 
simultaneously. This causes the active system chan-
nel to release the associated brake and energise a 
hydraulic valve to direct fluid to the motor. The ac-
tuator moves the stabiliser until the trim switches are 
released, the end of the stroke is reached, or a fault is 
detected. The system is monitored for faults, such as 
loss of hydraulic pressure, valve or motor failure, by 
comparing the sensed motor speed and stabiliser mo-
tion rate with the actual trim command. 
The minimal path sets detection method reveals 
those conditions that cause a system to operate. The 
example system is considered operational if it moves 
the stabiliser surface according to the actual com-
mand and holds it in place if no command is present. 
2.3.2 Component modelling 
The modelling of the stabiliser trim system includes 
one-dimensional mechanics with elasticity, damp-
ing, inertia and friction; hydraulics with bulk modu-
lus, fluid density, turbulent and laminar flow; and 
resistive electrics. One of the developed component 
models is explained below. 
A spur (reduction) gear is essentially described by 
the ratio of input and output torques and angles: 0 = 𝐼𝑆𝐺 ∙ 𝜏𝑎 + 𝜏𝑏 , 𝜑𝑎 = 𝐼𝑆𝐺 ∙ 𝜑𝑏 (2) 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Spur gear model including disconnection and jam 
 
The “IdealGear” element introduces these equa-
tions to the spur gear model. The “Disconnect” and 
“Jam” elements are rotational spring-dampers de-
scribed by: 
𝜏 = 𝑐 ∙ 𝜑𝑟𝑒𝑙 + 𝑑 ∙ ?̇?𝑟𝑒𝑙, 𝜏 = 𝜏𝑏 = −𝜏𝑎, 
𝜑𝑟𝑒𝑙 = 𝜑𝑏 − 𝜑𝑎 (3) 
They are used to represent failures of the spur 
gear. To this end, the spring and damping coeffi-
cients (c and d) are varied as indicated by Table 2. In 
equations 2 and 3, indices a and b denote the rota-
tional flanges of the spur gear and of the spring-
damper elements (shown in Figure 3), respectively. 
 
Table 2. Modelling of spur gear failures by variation of spring 
and damping coefficients. [𝑐] = 𝑁𝑚 𝑟𝑎𝑑⁄ , [𝑑] = 𝑁𝑚𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑑⁄  
 mode 𝑐𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑛𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑛𝑐𝑡  𝑑𝑗𝑎𝑚 
normal operation 0 104 104 𝑑𝐺−𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑔 
disconnection 1 0 0 𝑑𝐺−𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑔 
jam 2 104 104 104 
 
In normal operation, the “Disconnect” element is 
quasi-rigid. It is literally broken to represent a dis-
connection of the spur gear. A jam is modelled by a 
quasi-rigid connection to the “fixed” element. The 
coefficient values implicate small relative rotations 
in the order of 𝜑𝑟𝑒𝑙 = 10−3𝑟𝑎𝑑 for a transferred 
torque of 10Nm, which is negligible for the present 
application. The coefficients have to be adapted for 
applications of different scale. The “Jam” element 
also reflects the friction of the intact spur gear, e.g. 
by 𝑑𝐺−𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑔 = 2 ∙ 10−4 𝑁𝑚𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑑⁄ . 
Normal operation (mode = 0) or disconnection 
(mode = 1) of the spur gear are considered for the 
detection of minimal path sets. 
2.3.3 System model 
Figure 4 shows an image of the developed stabiliser 
trim control and actuation system model. It contains 
two instances of the drive channel model depicted 
by Figure 5. Each channel consists of a control com-
puter, a hydraulic valve, motor and brake (POB) that 
are electrically activated. The channels are connect-
ed to different electric (DC1, 2) and hydraulic (Pres-
sure1, 2) sources. Each computer is connected to the 
trim switches (Up1, 2 and Down1, 2), and to the 
other channel computer for coordination of active or 
stand-by status. The model interface and connection 
types are as defined in Table 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Stabiliser trim control and actuation system model 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Model of a drive channel of the stabiliser trim system 
 
As explained in section 2.2.2, a system status output 
(not shown in the images) is computed for use by the 
minimal path sets detection (section 3). This output 
indicates if the system operates normally or if it fails 
(no motion or uncommanded motion). To this end, 
the actual motion rate of the stabiliser surface is 
compared with the command (trim switch inputs). 
3 DETECTION OF MINIMAL PATH SETS 
This section describes the proposed method for au-
tomated detection of the minimal path sets of a tech-
nical system. It is based on the idea that the related 
object-oriented model structure resembles the func-
tional paths that cause the system to operate. 
After detection of the minimal path sets, probabil-
ities of system operation 𝑅𝑠𝑦𝑠(𝑡) or failure 𝐹𝑠𝑦𝑠(𝑡) 
are computed from failure rates (section 2.2.3) using 
the method described by Heidtmann (1989). 
3.1 Definitions 
A path set is a set of intact components that causes a 
system to operate. A path set is minimal if it con-
tains only as many intact components as are neces-
sary for the system to operate. 
A path is a sequence of consecutive nodes in a 
graph, where each two successive nodes are con-
nected via an edge. 
A union (denoted by ∪) of a collection of paths 
consists of all nodes in the collection of paths. 
3.2 Properties of minimal path sets in an object-
oriented model 
The structure of an OOM is regarded as a graph. 
Nodes and edges of the graph represent components 
(objects) and connections between them. Nodes that 
include failure behaviour are indicated by filled cir-
cles in Figures 6, 7 (b), 8, 10 - 15. Non-filled circles 
indicate nodes that are always intact. Non-filled 
squares indicate auxiliary nodes. 
In such a graph, minimal path sets are not just sim-
ple s-t paths. An s-t path connects two nodes “s” and 
“t” of a graph through an unbranched, open walk: 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Several s-t paths in a graph 
 
Minimal path sets are sometimes unbranched, just 
as s-t paths are. In general, however, a minimal path 
set includes junctions or circles, as Figure 7 indi-
cates for a part of the stabiliser trim system model 
graph. The electric connections between the com-
puter (15), valve (9) and brake (5) introduce such 
junctions. (The numbering of nodes is consistent 
with Figures 11 - 14 and section 3.4.) Since there is 
more than one junction, circles exist in the graph. 
A minimal path set consists of one or more nodes. 
Power, material or signals are exchanged between 
neighboured nodes across the connections (edges) 
between them, as depicted in Figure 7. This causes a 
technical system to operate. Only neighboured 
nodes, i.e. coherent sets of nodes, can perform this 
exchange and render a system operational. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Exchange of power, material and signals across the 
edges in a coherent set of nodes – Part of OOM of stabiliser 
trim system (a) and corresponding graph (b) 
3.3 Detection method 
The proposed detection method belongs to the class 
of state space simulations. At first, the system model 
graph is evaluated to find candidates of minimal 
path sets. This is achieved by an adapted depth-first 
search algorithm and establishing of unions of the 
found paths. Then, the system model is simulated 
only for the candidates to detect the actual minimal 
path sets. Figure 9 shows a flow chart of the detec-
tion method. Without the prior evaluation of the 
model graph, the number of simulations would be 2𝑛𝑟, nr being the number of system components. 
3.3.1 An adapted depth-first search 
Due to the described properties of minimal path sets, 
it is meaningful to use a depth-first search (DFS) for 
detection. This algorithm is known from many refer-
ences, such as Krumke et al. (2012). It finds sets of 
consecutive nodes (paths) in a graph. In doing so, it 
commences at a start node and progresses into depth 
with one of the neighbours of each visited node. For 
the purpose of detecting minimal path sets, the algo-
rithm is adapted (→ DFSMP) with a definition of 
the target nodes. It finds the following types of path: 
a) Ties. A tie is a path that ends at a node already 
contained in the path. 
b) Circles. A circle is a special case of a tie. 
c) Open walks. An open walk ends at a node that 
only has one neighbour. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Ties (a), circles (b) and open walks (c) in a graph 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Flow chart of a minimal path sets detection method 
3.3.2 Unions of paths 
The DFSMP is capable of finding minimal path sets 
that include a junction or circle. Still, a minimal path 
set might not be detected if the start node is unfa-
vourably selected, or if more than one junction or 
circle occur. To accommodate for such formations 
(present in Figure 7), unions of paths are established. 
This corresponds with step 4 of Figure 9. 
The maximum number of unions is denoted by 
the binomial 
 
�
𝑛
𝑘� = 𝐶(𝑛,𝑘) = 𝑛!𝑘!∙(𝑛−𝑘)! (4)  
where n is the number of all paths and k is the num-
ber of paths to be merged in a union. The actual 
number of unions qk is much lower, dependent on 
the density d of the graph. d is generally defined, 
e.g. by Roberts et al. (2007), as 
 
𝑑(𝑁,𝐸) = 2∙𝐸
𝑁∙(𝑁−1) (5)  
For the three graphs depicted in Figure 10, each 
having N = 5 nodes, the number of edges E, density 
and number of paths n are listed in Table 3. The 
paths are established starting from node “a” accord-
ing to the rules defined in section 3.3.1. Since the 
sequence of nodes in a path or union does not mat-
ter, duplicates are removed. n paths or, respectively, 
qk unions are kept as summarised in Table 4. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Three graphs of different density 
 
Table 3. Number of edges, density, and number of paths 
graph E d 𝑛 
(1) 4 0.4 3 
(2) 7 0.7 5 
(3) 10 1 11 
 
Table 4. Binomial (n in rows, k in columns) and actual number 
of unions qk for the three graphs 
𝐶(𝑛, 𝑘) 2 3 4 5 qk 2 3 4 5 
3 3 1   3 3 1   
5 10 10 5 1 5 3 2 1 1 
11 55 165 330 462 11 5 5 5 1 
 
For the complete graph (d = 1), qk is much lower 
than the corresponding binomial. The reason is that 
the paths are longer, the higher the density of the 
graph is. The longer the paths are, the more they 
cover the graph. Unions of long paths cover the 
graph even more, so the number of different unions 
qk is relatively low. For a low-density graph, the 
paths are relatively short, so relatively more differ-
ent unions (compared to the binomial) occur. 
3.3.3 Removal of odd nodes 
In some cases, the detected path sets are not mini-
mal. This means that more (odd) nodes are contained 
in a path set than are necessary to cause the system 
to operate. A path set is minimal only if a failure of 
any of its nodes (components) causes system failure. 
Thus, a check is introduced at the end of the de-
tection method (step 14 in Figure 9): Tracing and 
removal of odd nodes. 
Essentially, the check proceeds by simulating the 
system model for each path set such that one of its 
nodes fails, one by one, while the others are intact. If 
the system still operates, then the respective path set 
is stored without the failed node. This is repeated 
until no odd nodes are detected in any path set any-
more. Since it is basic trial-and-error, without any 
evaluation of the model graph, this check is used on-
ly to assure that the path sets are minimal by remov-
ing a small number of odd nodes, if necessary. 
3.3.4 Separation of physical domains 
The number of paths n in a graph increases strongly 
with the number of its nodes N and density d, the 
phenomenon known as combinatorial explosion. 
This is clarified by an estimation of the number z of 
s-t paths proposed by Roberts et al. (2007) for 
graphs of a density 𝑑 ∈ [0.1; 0.9]. (The DFSMP de-
tects three different kinds of paths. However, estima-
tions exist only of the number of s-t paths.) 
 
𝑧(𝑁,𝑑) ≈ 𝐾(𝑁) ∙ 𝑑𝑁−1+𝛿(𝑁,𝑑)    where 
 
𝐾(𝑁) = ∑ (𝑁−2)!
𝑘!𝑁−2𝑘=0 , 𝛿(𝑁,𝑑) = 3.32𝑁 − 5.16𝑑∙𝑁   (6)  
It is proposed to mitigate the growth phenomenon 
by splitting up the model graph at the boundaries of 
the physical domains. These are identified by the 
different types of model interfaces (listed in Table 
1). Thus, a model graph split-up algorithm is created 
that recognises these interface attributes. 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Subgraphs of stabiliser trim system model 
 
Smaller subgraphs are established that are evalu-
ated one by one according to the flow chart of Fig-
ure 9. (Due to splitting up the model graph, some 
additions to the algorithm are needed, as Schallert 
(2014) describes.) Figure 11 shows the subgraphs 
established for the stabiliser trim system model. Ta-
ble 5 lists some of the properties of the model graph 
before split-up (all-up) and of the subgraphs. n are 
the actual numbers of paths found in a (sub-)graph. 
 
Table 5. Number of nodes, edges, density, estimated number of 
s-t paths and actual number of paths in (sub-)graphs 
sub-
graph 
N E d z n 
all-up 36 54 0.086 1766 1932 
M 8 7 0.25 2.4 3 
H S 10 9 0.2 2.09 4 
E 26 38 0.117 244 91 
3.4 Course of minimal path sets detection algorithm 
for the stabiliser trim system model 
The minimal path sets detection algorithm is exem-
plified by means of the stabiliser trim system model. 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Evaluation of mechanical domain subgraph 
 
Subgraph M is evaluated first, starting from node 
2 (ballscrew in Figure 4). Figure 12 shows this stage 
of the algorithm. The DFSMP finds three paths (pa-
rentheses indicate nodes that are always intact): 
path1 = {2, (1)};  path2 = {2, 3, 4, 5, 7}; 
path3 = {2, 3, 4, 6, 8} 
The three paths are tested by simulation of the 
system model (steps 6. - 10. in Figure 9). At the 
same time, all nodes covered by the shaded area are 
intact. The result of this first iteration is that the sys-
tem does not operate for any of the three paths. 
Thus, steps 6. - 10. are repeated for k = 2, which 
reveals that the system operates for the union {2, 3, 
4, 5, 6, 7, 8}. The removal of odd nodes (step 14. in 
Figure 9) leads to storing the two, yet incomplete 
minimal path sets 
MP1 = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7};    MP2 = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8} 
These are indicated by the green nodes in Figure 
13. After this, the evaluation of subgraph M ends. 
The algorithm continues by evaluating subgraph 
H S for each of the two incomplete minimal path 
sets. For MP1, the DFSMP starts from node 7 (as 
shown by Figure 13) and finds four paths: 
path1 = {7, 9, 11}; path2 = {7, 15, 16, 8, 10, (14)} 
path3 = {7, 9, (12)}; path4 = {7, 15, 16, 8, 10, 13} 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Hydraulic and signal domains subgraph evaluation 
 
Next, the paths are tested by simulating the sys-
tem model (steps 6. - 10. in Figure 9 for k = 1). In 
doing so, those nodes are intact that belong to MP1 
∪ pathj, ∀𝑗 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} respectively. Also, all 
nodes covered by the shaded area are intact. The 
system does not operate. The next iteration (k = 2) 
reveals that the system operates for the union MP1 ∪ 
path1 ∪ path2. The removal of odd nodes leads to 
storing MP1 = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 15}. 
The algorithm proceeds accordingly for the sec-
ond minimal path set (DFSMP starts from node 8). 
After the evaluation of subgraph H S is complete, it 
is stored as MP2 = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 13, 16}. The 
two minimal path sets developed so far are indicated 
by the green nodes in Figure 14. 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Evaluation of electrical domain subgraph 
 
Next, the algorithm evaluates subgraph E to com-
plete the two minimal path sets. For MP1, the 
DFSMP starts from node 5 and find 91 paths. Three 
of them are: 
path1 = {5,17,15,25}; path2 = {5, 18, 15, 21, 9, 22}; 
path3 = {5, 17, 15, (33), 27, (31), 28, (34), 16, (36), 
30, (32), 29, (35)} 
The loop (steps 6. - 10. in Figure 9) of testing 
paths and unions by simulating the system model is 
repeated up to k = 3. Then, the system operates for 
the union MP1 ∪ path1 ∪ path2 ∪ path3. Odd nodes 
are removed, and the minimal path set is stored as 
MP1 = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 15, 17, 18, 21, 22, 25, 
27, 28, 29, 30}. 
For k = 2, C(91, 2) = 4095 unions were estab-
lished of which a number of qk = 634 remained after 
removal of duplicates. For k = 3, C(91, 3) = 121485 
unions were established of which a number of qk = 
1279 remained. As explained, the model is simulated 
only for the respective qk unions. 
Next, the second minimal path set is completed 
by starting a DFSMP from node 6. The loop of test-
ing paths and unions in the simulation is run through 
up to k = 3 with similar computing effort. The result 
is MP2 = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 13, 16, 19, 20, 23, 24, 
26, 27, 28, 29, 30}. Both complete minimal path sets 
are indicated by the green nodes in Figure 15. 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Minimal path set of stabiliser trim system 
 
The total number of system model simulations 
performed is 4129. Most of them are caused by step 
6., and a few are due to step 14. of the minimal path 
sets detection algorithm depicted by Figure 9. If the 
model graph was not split up (row 1 in Table 5), this 
would cause a total of > 615000 simulations, which 
is unfeasible. Without any evaluation of the model 
graph, the number would even be 227 = 1.34⋅108 due 
to the system comprising 27 components (nodes) 
that include failure behaviour. 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper described and exemplified a method for 
minimal path sets detection of a technical system 
that is represented by a multi-domain object-oriented 
model. The method is the core of an automatic safe-
ty analysis that can be performed throughout the de-
sign process of the system, thus keeping the analysis 
consistent with design iterations. It is meaningful to 
apply the method if multi-domain object-oriented 
modelling is used already in systems engineering. 
The proposed method enhances the scope of applica-
tion of a system model while permitting all other 
simulation studies that originally motivated devel-
opment of the model to be conducted. 
The method belongs to the class of state space 
simulations. A search algorithm from graph theory is 
adapted to evaluate the object structure of the model, 
which prevents exponential growth of the state space 
and thus unfeasibility of the method. 
Further detail of the proposed method, estimation 
of computing effort, as well as modelling and analy-
sis examples are described by Schallert (2014). 
It must be beared in mind that all model-based 
analysis methods capture only those phenomena that 
are covered in the modelling approach. Then again, 
the automation ensures that all relevant failure con-
ditions (at least in so far as modelled) are consid-
ered, whereas a manually conducted analysis might 
be errorneous or incomplete. 
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